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"GOING PRIVATE" SEVENTEEN YEARS LATER
A.A. SOMMER, JR.*
THE 1974 SPEECH
In November 1974 1 gave a speech at Notre Dame Law School entitled
"Going Private". A Lesson in Corporate Responsibility. At that time there
was a good deal of discussion concerning corporate responsibility as a
consequence of the disclosures that American corporations had been en-
gaged in extensive violations of our laws concerning corporate contribu-
tions to political campaigns and questionable payments abroad to secure
preferment.
I chose in the Notre Dame speech to focus on a less publicized, then
less recognized, problem of corporate responsibility. The staff of the
Commission had for several months before the speech been calling my
attention to something called "going private." They had suggested that
there was a growing tendency of corporations which had fairly recently
gone public to buy back their stock at prices substantially lower than the
prices at which they had gone public. In many instances the initial pub-
lic offerings had involved substantial offerings by controlling sharehold-
ers who realized tremendous gains from those offerings.' In 1975 and
thereabouts the market prices of most companies were severely de-
pressed,2 hence the prices offered in the "going-private" private transac-
tions, which were usually significantly more than the current market
price, but substantially under the initial offering price, were very attrac-
tive to the companies' shareholders and they responded enthusiastically
to the offers.
A variety of techniques was being used to accomplish the goal of going
* Partner, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius.
1. See Full Text of Commissioner Sommer's Remarks on "Going Private," Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) No. 278, at D-1 (Nov. 20, 1974). In the Notre Dame speech I cited a company (Wells, Rich,
Greene, Inc., though I did not identify it by name in the speech) that had made public offerings in
which the selling shareholders received $12.5 million ($17.50 a share in one offering and $21.75 in
another). Not long thereafter the company went private at $3.00 a share cash and an $8.00 ten-year
subordinated debenture. None of the consideration came from the shareholders who had sold in the
public offering.
2. "By the end of 1974, the Dow Jones Industrial Average, the traditional index of stock
market performance, collapsed to below 600, from a January, 1973, peak of over 1000. In the vi-
cious '73-'74 bear market, stocks began selling at ever lower price/earnings ratios." ARTHUR M.
BORDEN, GOING PRIVATE 2-7 (1982).
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private.3 In some cases the management organized a new corporation
into which they placed their shares, which then tendered for the publicly
held stock, and when the new company had control, any remaining pub-
lic shareholders were "squeezed out" through a merger in which they
received cash. Even though the effectuation through this means de-
pended on voluntary responses by public shareholders (unless manage-
ment and its cohorts had effective control before the offer), there was
nonetheless a coercive element present: the shareholder, even if tempted
to forgo the rich premium over market, had a fear that his or her fellow
shareholders would respond and he or she would be left with an illiquid
holding at the mercy of a possible future squeezeout on less favorable
terms.
In some cases management dispensed with the tender offer and, after
setting up the new corporation having management's stock as its asset,
submitted to shareholders a proposal to merge with the new company,
with the merger agreement providing that all shareholders except the
new company would receive cash.
Another method was the reverse split. Management would submit to
shareholders a proposal to issue, say, one share for each thousand shares
held, with fractions to be paid in cash. In such cases typically the mem-
bers of management were most of the holders with holdings sufficiently
large to end up with whole shares, thus either owning or controlling the
company at the conclusion of the process, with virtually all other share-
holders ousted with cash. Again there was the lure of the premium.
Whatever the method, one circumstance was omnipresent: the assets
of the corporation, which belonged to the shareholders, were used to buy
them out.4 In many instances the cash consideration was procured in
whole or in part by borrowing; such borrowing was only possible because
of the value of the corporation's assets or its earning power, both of
which belonged to the shareholders.
My initial reaction to the concerns of the staff was "So what?" The
shareholders were receiving more than the market price; where the insid-
ers lacked control the public shareholders were free to accept or reject
the offer; if the price they received was "fair"-where was the problem?
3. The various methods of "going private" are discussed in BORDEN, supra note 2, at 3-3 to 3-
16.
4. This was so even when all or part of the consideration was debt, as in the Wells, Rich,
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The more I reflected on the problem, however, the more concerned I
became with this phenomenon. While nominally it appeared the share-
holders had a free choice of responding or not to the proposal of manage-
ment, and while the prices offered were typically more than the market
price, in many cases opined as "fair" by estimable investment bankers, it
became clearer to me that the freedom of choice of the shareholders was
often ephemeral. Often the transaction was framed in a manner that was
coercive (e.g., a tender offer posing the danger that a non-tendering
shareholder might receive less in a squeeze-out merger or be left hanging
with an illiquid security), or management effectively controlled the vote,
or the public shareholders having seen the the value of their investment
battered in the bear market happily grabbed the apparently generous pre-
mium. Moreover, it appeared that the insiders were taking advantage of
the unusually depressed state of the market in the mid-70s to avail them-
selves of the opportunity to bring their companies back to their private
status, meanwhile having enriched their companies and themselves with
the proceeds of offerings made when the market was most hospitable to
new offerings. That did not strike me as fair. More, it struck me as
posing some troublesome questions legally. The officers and directors
who initiated the offering had fiduciary responsibilities to the sharehold-
ers to whom they made the offer. Was their conduct consistent with
those responsibilities? I doubted it.
The speech did not go unnoticed. It was delivered on a Thursday,
reported in the press on Friday, and on Tuesday a delegation represent-
ing one of the companies then in the process of going private was in the
office of SEC Chairman Ray Garrett, Jr. protesting my remarks. Chair-
man Garrett, my very dear friend (and the one who persuaded me to
accept appointment to the Commission), notwithstanding having told me
he did not agree with my speech, to his everlasting credit strongly de-
fended to the group the propriety of my remarks and gave them no sol-
ace. Another Commissioner, strongly in favor of free markets, felt that
any governmental intervention in the going-private process would be an
unwarranted interference in the freedom of buyers and sellers.
THE SEC AND "GOING PRIVATE"
Notwithstanding these misgivings, the Commission decided to under-
take to consider rules governing the practice. The first effort consisted of
the proposal of alternative rules; under one the consideration in a going-
private transaction would have to "constitute fair value" and under the
1992]
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other the terms of the transaction would have to be fair and there would
have to be a valid business purpose. Both proposals would have man-
dated considerable disclosure.5
Critics of the Commission's proposals, notably the Federal Regulation
of Securities Committee of the American Bar Association Section on
Business Law, quickly charged that the Commission was exceeding its
power in imposing substantive, as distinguished from disclosure, require-
ments with respect to these transactions.
In late 1977 (three years after the Notre Dame speech) the Commis-
sion proposed a rule that would have required both substantive and pro-
cedural fairness.6 The Commission responded to its critics and asserted
forcefully its belief that it had the power to impose substantive
requirements:
Neither the language of the subsection [section 13(e) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934] nor its legislative history limits the rulemaking author-
ity of the Commission solely to disclosure requirements. Consequently, in
adopting rules for the protection of investors and in the public interest to
prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent, deceptive or
manipulative acts and practices, Commission rulemaking under Section
13(e) may include substantive provisions as well as disclosure
requirements.7
The protesters carried the day, and the Commission adopted a rule
which was, indeed, confined to disclosure.8 The disclosure pushed as
close to substantive regulation as it could. The entity undertaking the
transaction was required to disclose:
whether it had considered other means of accomplishing the purposes of
the proposed transaction and why they were rejected;
the reasons for the proposed transaction and why it was undertaken at
the present time;
whether the entity undertaking the transaction reasonably believed the
transaction was fair or unfair to shareholders and the factors upon which
the belief was based;
5. "Going Private" Transactions, Securities Act Release No. 5567 (1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 80,104 (Feb. 6, 1975).
6. Going Private Transactions by Public Companies or Their Affiliates, Securities Act Release
No. 5884 [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,366 (Nov. 17, 1977).
7. Id. at 88,742. The Supreme Court confirmed the validity of the critics' position in Green v.
Santa Fe Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
8. Going Private Transactions by Public Companies or Their Affiliates, Securities Act Release
No. 6100 [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCI-I) 82,166 (Aug. 2, 1979).
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whether the entity undertaking the transaction had received any report,
opinion or appraisal from an outside party and the details of any such
report;
and a good deal of other information besides.9
The disclosure requirements did not deter going-private transactions.
As is typical, there developed a routine disclosure pattern that concealed
as much as it disclosed.
THE STATES AND "GOING PRIVATE"
Of course, the securities laws were not the only laws involved in going-
private transactions. Until roughly the beginning of this century the law
typically provided that a transaction between a corporation and a direc-
tor was voidable by the corporation regardless of fairness.1° Since this
rigorous rule in many cases denied corporations the opportunity for
transactions that might be desirable, even though a director was the op-
posite party, gradually the voidability rule evolved into a rule that in
such a transaction the director bore the burden of establishing that the
transaction was fair, in which case it was not voidable, and there then
developed the "safe harbor" which is a part of virtually all, if not all,
state corporation laws which validates the transaction if it has been ap-
proved by directors or shareholders not involved in the transaction after
full disclosure of the director's conflict and the nature of the transaction.
Even when the statutory safe harbor was invoked to validate the transac-
tion, courts were not indifferent to the fairness of the transaction.1
The typical going-private transaction involving management (the
MBO), of course, was an interested-party transaction, the corporation on
one side, members of management, at least some of whom were directors,
on the other. During the 70s the state courts (and federal courts apply-
ing state law) wrestled with the problems posed by these transactions. In
Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co. ,2 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
viewed a transaction involving the squeezeout of a minority shareholder
9. Id.
10. NORMAN D. LArIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 290 (2d ed. 1971); HARRY G. HENN &
JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 637 (3d ed. 1983); 1 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT
ANN. § 41, 2 (1971); Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate
Morality, 22 Bus. LAW. 35 (1966).
11. Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 241 P.2d 66 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952); Scott v.
Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44 (D.N.J. 1974).
12. 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974).
1992]
Washington University Open Scholarship
576 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
and concluded the transaction was illegal, among other reasons, because
there was no valid business purpose.
For a period the Delaware Supreme Court subscribed to the idea that
such transactions had to have a business purpose,13 but in Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc.14 it retreated from that position. However, it stated that any
such transaction had to satisfy two fairness tests: one, fairness of price,
and two, "fair dealing," which the court said "... embraces questions of
when the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negoti-
ated, disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals of the directors
and the stockholders was obtained."15 In my speech I had suggested that
one of the unfairnesses of the then current going-private transactions was
the selection by managements of a time when the entire stock market was
depressed to make their offer.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MBOs IN THE 80s
With the federal disclosure rules in place, and the state law fairly well
articulated, the way was clear for the efficient accomplishment of MBOs.
A pattern developed. Management would make an offer backed by the
opinion of an investment banking firm concerning its fairness. The in-
dependent directors on the board, or a portion of them, would be consti-
tuted as a committee to determine the fairness of the transaction. The
committee would select its own counsel and employ investment bankers
to advise them on the fairness of the offer. In some cases (the RJR
Nabisco transaction is a notable example)1 6 the committee would negoti-
ate with management and any other bidders that might emerge in an
effort to secure the best price for the shareholders.
Commonly these transactions elicited lawsuits questioning the inde-
pendence of the committee, the adequacy of the ultimate price, and other
terms of the transaction. Generally the conduct of the committee was
protected by the business judgment rule.17 And of course, in the typical
transaction there was some action by shareholders, either by tendering or
voting for the transaction."
13. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
14. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
15. Id. at 711 (emphasis supplied).
16. See BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE (1990).
17. Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 405 n.3 (Del. 1987) (dictum).
18. Of course, even a shareholder vote may be insufficient to overcome a flawed directorial
action. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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At the time of my speech in 1974 "going private" was "small pota-
toes." Professor Louis Lowenstein has noted that one study showed that
the mean market value of publicly held securities of forty-five companies
listed on the New York Stock Exchange or the American Stock Ex-
change which went private in the 1970s was only three million dollars.19
The 80s, of course, were a different story.2° The full potential of lever-
age became clear and the size of LBOs (and MBOs) increased dramati-
cally, culminating in the RJR Nabisco transaction in which the company
was sold for twenty-five billion dollars. This had started as an MBO,
instigated by Ross Johnson, the then CEO, but his group was outbid by
one headed by Kohlberg Kravis Roberts.21
During the middle 70s, when the going-private phenomenon came into
public focus, the typical MBO did not lead to a competitive bidding con-
test between management and one or more rivals. The reasons for this
are not certain, but certainly the then depressed state of equity markets
and the conservatism of lenders acted as restraints. Thus the dynamic
discussed above-management bid, independent directors validating the
fairness of the price, general judicial concurrence in the propriety of the
procedure-was the prevailing pattern.
This troubled some commentators. In 1983, then SEC Commissioner
Bevis Longstreth, in a speech before a committee of the International Bar
Association Section on Business Law in Toronto, expressed misgivings
about whether the prevailing pattern operated to assure fairness to
shareholders:
In management buyouts, the current rules of the game-both federal and
state-fail adequately to assure to public shareholders a fair deal-that is,
the highest current price reasonably obtainable, whether from management
or one or more third party purchasers of stock or assets.22
Commissioner Longstreth recommended that whenever management
proposed to buy out the public shareholders there should be mandated
an auction. All interested bidders would be provided with all material
information necessary to frame an informed bid and the highest bidder
would prevail. His approach ignored the fact that there was no practica-
19. Louis Lowenstein, Management Buyouts, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 730, 735 (1985).
20. In 1987 and 1988 public-company buyouts approached half a billion dollars per year.
Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 65.
21. See BURROUGH & HELYAR, supra note 16.
22. Bevis Longstreth, Management Buyouts: Are Public Shareholders Getting a Fair Deal?,
Address Before the Section on Business Law, Committee Q, Securities Issues and Trading, Toronto,
Canada (Oct. 6, 1983) (copy on file with author).
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ble way to put outsiders on an informationally equal basis with manage-
ment: no matter how much information was furnished, the management
would always know more about the business, its strengths, its weak-
nesses, its prospects, than any outsider, regardless of the disclosure made.
Even as Commissioner Longstreth spoke, the auction he sought was
becoming a commonplace. With generous bank financing, and then
"junk bonds," increasingly available, almost every bid by management to
take over a company was contested. This led to bidding wars in which
often the ultimate price paid by the successful bidder was by any stan-
dard of sound investment astronomical.23
As the 80s wore on, the LBOs (and the subspecies, MBOs) became
more commonplace, steadily larger, more heavily leveraged, and gener-
ally upheld by the courts. As the boom of the 80s continued, many of
these transactions appeared to fulfill the abundant optimism of their pro-
moters: significant tax savings, the benefits of leverage, greater efficien-
cies, poor performing assets sold and other circumstances resulted in
considerable benefits. Earnings and cash flow reflected the heavy interest
burdens and the requirements of principal amortization under the indebt-
edness incurred to finance the transaction. The degree of leverage stead-
ily grew reflecting the increased flexibility of bank lenders and the
increasing availability of junk bonds.
There appears to be a good deal of uncertainty among economists
about the sources of these extraordinary gains. Tax benefits are one
source, though some have tended to minimize the significance of these.24
Another is supposedly the additional incentive provided to management,
because of their newly enhanced ownership interest, to manage the assets
of the enterprise more efficiently, more aggressively, and ultimately more
profitably.25 Such entrepreneurial resourcefulness has included selling
off properties, in some cases because of their drag on profitability, in
others because they could be sold at extremely favorable prices.
THE PROBLEMS OF MBOs
Notwithstanding the willingness of the courts to sanction these trans-
actions and notwithstanding the immediate benefits received by share-
holders, there still remain some formidable legal issues stemming from
23. Lowenstein, supra note 19, at 738-39.
24. Yakov Amihud, Leveraged Management Buyouts and Shareholders' Wealth, in LEVER-
AGED MANAGEMENT BUYOUTs 26 (Yakov Amihud ed., 1989).
25. Jensen, supra note 20, at 68.
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the fiduciary responsibility which management owed to the shareholders
of the enterprise before it was taken private.
The first such problem derives from the simple fact that those in man-
agement are fiduciaries for the shareholders and may not take or use
corporate assets for their own gain. If management is willing to pay a
premium over the market for the publicly held stock, it can only be be-
cause it believes there is unrealized value in the company above the price
it is willing to pay; otherwise there would be no reason for it to make the
offer to purchase. Doesn't that value belong to the shareholders? But
more important, doesn't the fiduciary duty which management owes the
shareholders require it to bend every effort to see to it that benefit is
realized by the shareholders?
Some commentators have identified other corporate assets that man-
agement appropriates to itself when it causes the company it serves to go
private. For instance, the author of a note in the Yale Law Journal has
said,
A dynamic view of going private reveals the issue of insider self-dealing
through the misappropriation of a corporate asset-the ability to go public,
at a profit, when the stock market finally reverses itself. Insiders are correct
when they state that going private represents a good investment: that in-
vestment value, however, does not derive from the public marketplace,
which by definition does not deal in privately held companies, but from the
possibility of returning to that marketplace at a figure considerably higher
than the value at which the company withdrew.26
A frequent justification for the enormous benefits which usually accrue
to management in the course of a buyout is that such are necessary to
provide the incentive to maximize the realization of the value of the as-
sets of the enterprise. Are we to believe that as generously as manage-
ments are compensated, it still is not enough to elicit their best endeavors
on behalf of the shareholders? There is a troublesome anomaly here:
conventional methods of executive compensation plus fiduciary duty are
not sufficient to maximize management efforts to realize the greatest
profit from the resources made available to them. Thus, any enterprise
where there are no entrepreneurial profit opportunities like those pro-
vided in MBOs available to management will be less efficiently and profit-
ably managed than one where such opportunity is available. Thus giant
26. Edward D. Kleinbard, Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903, 931 (1975). See also Bill
Shaw, Resolving the Conflict of Interests in Management Buyouts, 19 HOFSTRA L. REv. 143, 150
(1990).
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enterprises which cannot be practicably taken private-USX, General
Motors, Exxon, and innumerable others-will be managed less success-
fully than might be the case were they taken private, regardless of the
generosity of compensation arrangements provided by their boards. This
concept, eerily reminiscent of the theory espoused by Henry G. Manne
that insiders should be permitted to trade on inside information because
that is the only way to adequately compensate them,27 bodes ill for the
American economy since, notwithstanding the multitude of LBOs, most
of this country's economic wealth is in the hands of publicly held corpo-
rations. One would be tempted to attribute to this circumstance the de-
cline of American competitiveness, but for the fact that the wealth of our
competitors is also concentrated in corporations having substantial pub-
lic ownership.
The necessity of the sort of "entrepreneurial" compensation received
by managements in MBOs has been woven into a comprehensive eco-
nomic and social explanation of the going-private phenomenon by
Michael Jensen of the Harvard Business School entitled The Eclipse of
the Public Corporation. 28 Professor Jensen sees the wave of the future, at
least in some industries, as corporations in which the equity is held by
management and by one or a limited number of organizations like KKR
(Jensen calls them "LBO associations") and the corporation is heavily
leveraged. In Jensen's estimation, this configuration provides several
benefits. The leveraging places additional pressure on a management al-
ready heavily motivated because of their equity interest to maximize per-
formance. Second, the other holders of equity provide the oversight
function which he finds lacking in the conventional publicly held com-
pany. And the heavy leverage permits an earlier signal of declining per-
formance of the corporation than in the case of a corporation less heavily
leveraged.
Jensen's theory appears to have had a short life span. Notwithstand-
ing the purported benefits to the economy, to the public holders of com-
panies that follow the MBO route, and to the investors in the capital
pools organized to invest in the enterprises taken public, economic events
have conspired to suggest that Jensen's bold insight into the future was
the fruit of a euphoria born of the excesses of the 80s. Beleaguered banks
which have had to take huge reserves against the LBO financings of the
27. HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).
28. Jensen, supra note 20.
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80s are reluctant to repeat their mistakes; with the Drexel Burnham-
Milken disaster, the opportunities to market junk bonds to facilitate
MBOs have diminished sharply; and strangest of all, the number of new
issues is reaching all-time highs. There are few willing to ride the wave
of the future identified by Jensen and plunge into the sort of transactions
he commends. Not only have events refuted Jensen's grandiose thesis,
but also thoughtful commentators have soundly belabored it.29
There is no reason why, in most cases, the management of enterprises
publicly held could not have accomplished most of the same dramatic
gains in profitability and efficiency without an MBO if they so chose.3 0
They could have done the same sort of restructuring, sold off un-
derperforming operations and assets, taken advantage of hefty prices for
divisions, even incurred sharply higher levels of debt with the proceeds
distributed to shareholders if necessary to put their feet to the fire, if they
wished. It is difficult to believe that going private somehow or other
stimulated creative juices in management that opened their eyes to op-
portunities never before beheld. And if there were concern about the ac-
ceptability of such a program to shareholders, it could be submitted to
shareholders and in all probability they would have acquiesced in it.
The fairness problem is compounded when companies that had only
lately gone private in MBOs surface again in the equity markets and they
are once more publicly held, notwithstanding the alleged benefits of being
privately held: avoidance of shareholder litigation, savings on the ex-
pense of compliance with SEC disclosure requirements and shareholder
communications, the ability of management to think and plan long term,
and so on.
Not uncommonly the expectation of going public was a part of the
29. Alfred Rappaport, The Staying Power of the Public Corporation, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-
Feb. 1990, at 96.
30. "Since an MBO brings no new resources-whether operating, financial or managerial-to
the target company, each of the potential sources of gain from the transaction is at least theoretically
available to the target company even without an MBO." Ronald J. Gilson, Market Review of Inter-
ested Transactions: The American Law Institute Proposal on Management Buyouts, in LEVERAGED
MANAGEMENT BuYotrrs, supra note 24, at 217, 219. Gilson then goes on to discuss each of the
purported benefits of the MBO-taxes, debt, management incentives-and shows how each is repli-
cable in the context of the public corporation. See also Rappaport, supra note 29, at 100: "An
institutionalized shareholder-value program can spur the same performance improvements as an
LBO. The program seeks a buyin from management rather than a buyout of shareholders." Rap-
paport then sets forth in detail how such comparable performance may be accomplished. A similar
program is detailed in G. Bennett Stewart, Remaking the Public Corporation from Within, HARV.
Bus, REV., July-Aug. 1990, at 126.
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initial planning, with indebtedness structured so that there would be a
"balloon," say, five years out which would be paid off with the proceeds
of the offering. Such "round trips" have been extremely lucrative.,
Leslie Fay, which was taken private in April 1982 for fifty-eight million
dollars, went public in August 1986 for $360 million.32 Fred Meyer,
which went private in December 1981 with a payout to shareholders of
$420 million, publicly offered its retail operations for $380 million in
1987, while the management and its financiers continued to hold the real
estate, estimated to be worth over $500 million, formerly owned by the
company (along the way while privately held management secured other
significant gains with virtually no cash investment).33 Michael C. Jensen
summarized a study by Steven N. Kaplan which aptly captures the enor-
mous gains realized by "roundtrips" and other transactions in which the
private company was disposed of:
... in buyouts that go public again or are otherwise sold (which occurs on
average 2.7 years after the original transaction), total shareholder value in-
creased by an average of 235%, or nearly 100% above market-adjusted re-
turns over the same period. These returns are distributed about equally
between pre-buyout shareholders and the suppliers of debt and equity to the
transaction. Prebuyout shareholders earn average market-adjusted premi-
ums of 38%, while the total return to capital (debt plus equity) for buyout
investors is 42%. This return to buyout investors is measured on the total
purchase price of the LBO, not buyout equity. Because equity returns are
almost a pure risk premium, and therefore independent of the amount in-
vested, they are very high. The median market-adjusted return on buyout
equity is 785%, or 125% per year. 34
In the case of the public offering following an MBO, the management
capitalizes on the benefits it denied to the first generation of shareholders
by selling them to a second generation of shareholders. Steven N.
Kaplan has estimated that the total gains realized by pre-buyout public
shareholders and post-buyout investors beat the market return by about
31. STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM.
ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 101ST CONG., IsT SEss., LEVERAGED BUYOUTS AND THE POT OF
GOLD: 1989 UPDATE 49 (Comm. Print 1989) (prepared by Dr. Carolyn Kay Brancato).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Jensen, supra note 20, at 70-71 (emphasis supplied). Other commentators suggest even
shorter periods. In an analysis by Kidder, Peabody & Co. in October 1988, the median period
between completion of an LBO and launch of an Initial Public Offering (IPO) was 22 months, and
more than 70% of the companies were taken public within three years of their LBO dates. KIDDER,
PEABODY & Co., ANALYSIS OF INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS OF LEVERAGED BUYOUTS (1988).
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eighty percent for most of the 80s, and that this gain was split about
evenly between the two groups.35 However, as indicated by Jensen, when
analyzed in terms of return on buyout equity, the proportion of gain go-
ing to the buyout investors is vastly greater than that realized by the
former shareholders.
At the time of the new IPO, satiated now by their often huge gains in
the offering, and the debt having been paid down or to be extinguished
out of the proceeds of the offering, thus no longer with their feet in the
fire, management's diligence will presumably be lessened, but nonetheless
that diligence will typically be priced generously in the offering price to
the public. Thus the public investors will be buying something that may
no longer be in the company, namely, a highly motivated management.
Some who believe the conflict of interest between management and
shareholders in these transactions is so deep and enduring that it cannot
be remedied simply by a handsome premium price for the public share-
holders stock suggest radical solutions. Victor Brudney and Marvin A.
Chirelstein, respectively professors of law at Harvard and Yale Law
Schools, and Edward F. Greene, former Director of the SEC Division of
Corporation Finance, have suggested an outright ban on such transac-
tions.3 6 Others have suggested that some means should be required to
permit former shareholders to participate at least to some extent in the
riches stemming from going private by, for instance, giving them war-
rants to purchase shares at a low price if the company were later sold or
taken public.37 Some have urged that if the company is taken public
again within twelve months of the buyout at a premium over the price
paid in the buyout, some of the premium should be paid to the pre-
buyout shareholders.38
Seventeen years after my talk, LBOs and MBOs continue to command
the attention of lawyers and economists. Lawyers continue to fret about
such matters as those discussed in this Article.
All the while the process of going private has become relatively rou-
tine. The SEC and the courts have sufficiently articulated the ground
35. Steven N. Kaplan, Sources of Value in Management Buyouts, in LEVERAGED MANAGE-
MENT BUYOUTS, supra note 24, at 98.
36. Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE
L.J 1354, 1376 (1978); Edward F. Greene, Corporate Freeze-out Mergers A Proposed Analysis, 28
STAN. L. REV. 487, 512 (1976).
37. Shaw, supra note 26, at 165-66.
38. Arthur M. Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV.
987, 1040 (1974).
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rules so that attorneys may advise clients with confidence about how to
take a company private. And while the recession, the retrenching of
banks, and the departure of Michael Milken and Drexel Burnham from
the economic scene have slowed the pace of such transactions, they con-
tinue to be done.
CONCLUSION
To use the English version of an old French proverb, the more things
change, the more they are the same. The same questions of overall fair-
ness and fiduciary responsibilities hang like a shadow over the process.
The courts in effect sanction the transactions if the proper disclosures are
made and the conventional procedures-investment banker opinion, ap-
proval by disinterested directors, satisfaction of the minimal restraints of
the business judgment rule-are followed. But there continue to be
doubters that the legal analysis has been rigorous enough.
As indicated above, a number of solutions, some radical, have been
proposed to deal with the buyout phenomenon. Less aggressive sugges-
tions urge procedures to strengthen the reliability of the investment
banking opinion and the independence of the committee of directors
which reviews the proposals.3 9
There appears to be a considerable degree of comfort with the state of
the law as it exists today with respect to going-private transactions. Of
course, their incidence has diminished sharply in the last two or three
years, hence there is less occasion to dwell upon them. However, they
pose one of the most troubling problems in corporate law: to what extent
may management put its self-interest ahead of the interests of sharehold-
ers? Troubling are suggestions of the sort put forward by Professor Gil-
son that suggest management has a free rein to consider what is in its
interests, and if an MBO is the best means of accomplishing manage-
ment's purposes, then it should opt for an MBO. 4
One modest approach urged by this writer before a congressional com-
mittee was that management should be permitted to bid for a company
only if a third party had first made a bid. In that situation management
should not be precluded from participating in an auction initiated by
third parties. Such an approach satisfies the concerns of former Commis-
39. Dale Arthur Oesterle & Jon R. Norberg, Management Buyouts.: Creating or Appropriating
Shareholder Wealth?, 41 VAND. L. REv. 207, 249-59 (1988).
40. Gilson, supra note 30, at 220.
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sioner Longstreth and prescinds from the shortcomings of investment
banker opinions and the infirmities of special committees. It removes the
danger of management "low balling" in their bid and assures the price
ultimately paid is a market price. Once the outside bidder has com-
menced an offer, there is little reason to preclude insiders from entering
the fray. If the assets of the company, including its future prospects, are
to be acquired by someone, there is no sound reason why that someone
should not be management.
Thus we come to this proposal. Management should not be allowed
to determine unilaterally the price of the corporation, and they should
not be allowed to hide behind investment banker opinions and independ-
ent director committees. Only if there is a third party expressing a will-
ingness to buy the company should insiders be allowed in the arena. In
that situation any enrichment that management may realize is the same
as the enrichment that would accrue to outsiders did they not join the
bidding. It is difficult to fault management in this situation.
The "going-private" phenomenon continues to be with us. It is a con-
tinuing challenge to the ethics of the corporate community and to the
law governing interested transactions.
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